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Abstract:  This paper examines the agency model of dividends where the importance of dividends 
depends on the level of investor protection. The importance of dividends is presented by 
the dividend smoothing concept, while the level of investor protection is determined by the 
legal origin. Within this, the sensitivity of dividends to earnings changes was analyzed to 
examine the universality of the dividend smoothing phenomenon. Subsequently, the dif-
ference in proportions of dividend smoothing firms within the common law and civil law 
countries was tested to determine which of these two systems attributes more importance to 
dividends. Finally, the application of Lintner’s model was examined in transition countries 
as well as in United States. Research results show that dividend smoothing is a globally 
widespread phenomenon, but the likelihood to reduce or cut dividends is greater in civil 
law countries. Also, the largest percentage of dividend smoothing firms was recorded in 
common law countries. 
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Introduction
The practice of dividend smoothing was recognized by John Lintner in his 1956 pa-
per: Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings 
and Taxes. In this paper Lintner has shown that managers of the largest U.S. firms 
are not inclined to reduce dividends, while they will increase dividends only if they 
believe that new levels of earnings can support an increase in dividends. Conclusions 
derived from original Lintner’s model and its subsequent validations (Fama & Ba-
biak, 1968; Aivazian et al., 2006; Brav et al., 2005; etc.) have made it a benchmark 
model of dividends. Incentives for this kind of policy stem from information asym-
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metry or agency problems and signalling theory. These two aspects are closely relat-
ed because the agency problem arises from the information gap between the agent 
and principal. Most of the empirical research has been focused on the United States 
which is considered as the most developed capital market with strongly dispersed 
ownership structure and a significant level of information asymmetry between insid-
ers and outsiders. Different sources of financing are characterized by different access 
to information and various types of conflict of interest, so the role of dividends can 
be seen as a reflection of these differences. More precisely, it is to be expected that 
dividends as a mechanism for reducing the information gap between insiders and 
outsiders, or as an investor protection mechanism, will be less important in bank-cen-
tric financial systems because financing through bank loans implies easier access to 
financial information of the firm. The aim of this paper is to examine the importance 
of the dividend policy in different legal environments, starting from the conclusions 
reached by La Porta et al. (2000), who demonstrated that stronger investor protection 
leads to more generous dividend distribution, assuming the firm does not have attrac-
tive investment opportunities.
The paper is organized as follows: The first part of the paper analyzes the previous 
research on the link between investor protection, development of capital markets and 
dividend policy. The second part of the paper describes the research sample and data 
sources. In the third part, the probability of dividend changes for the given changes in 
earnings within the four legal families is analyzed, while the fourth section examines 
the relationship between investor protection and dividend policy measured by the 
level of dividend smoothing. The fifth section includes testing the Lintner’s model of 
dividends in transition countries that follow civil law tradition and in United States 
of America as common law country, while the sixth section brings final conclusions 
based on the work of this paper.
Literature review
Previous research studies have shown that stage of capital market development de-
pends on strength of investor protection. Among the most important researches on 
the link between investor protection and capital market development are those of La 
Porta et al. which are based on the legal determinants of external finance. La Porta et 
al. (1997) point out that countries with weaker investor protection, measured by stat-
utory rules and the quality of their application, have less developed capital markets. 
In this way, Anglo-Saxon (common) law countries have a stronger investor protection 
than countries whose legal origin comes from continental (civil) law. In addition, the 
authors have documented a negative link between investor protection and ownership 
concentrations, which is in line with the hypothesis that small and dispersed share-
holders will not play a major role in countries that fail to protect their rights. Like-
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wise, La Porta et al. (2006) have shown that securities market laws differ significantly 
between countries and that those who explicitly require transparency are positively 
related to the capital market development.
In addition to the quality of legal protection mechanisms, Francis et al. (2001) 
argue that national financial reporting standards are more accurate and more trans-
parent in common law countries. This is not surprising, because the common law 
countries typically have higher dispersion of ownership structure and therefore high-
er demand for transparent corporate governance. Authors have further tested the dif-
ferences between countries within the civil law to verify whether the capital markets 
of countries with more up-to-date and transparent accounting standards and a stron-
ger audit are more developed from countries with less accurate and less transparent 
accounting standards. Authors failed to prove the existence of differences among 
civil law countries, after which they concluded that national standards and their ap-
plication were the direct consequence of laws relating to investor protection. Similar 
findings are published by Leuz et al. (2003) who investigated how investor protection 
affects incentives of insiders to manipulate earnings within research sample of 31 
countries. Authors have shown that more powerful legal investor protection limits 
the ability to manipulate earnings, leaving management less discretionary rights in 
making potentially harmful decisions for external investors.
On the basis of previous empirical research that shows that investor protection 
facilitates access to external finance, limits management incentives to expropriate 
investor funds, encourages more transparent financial reporting and improves arbi-
trage, Mclean et al. (2012) point to the importance of investor protection for firm-level 
resource allocation. In a sample of firms drawn from 44 countries during the period 
1990 to 2007 authors have noticed that stock prices are more efficient in predicting 
investments and external finance in countries with a higher level of investor protec-
tion. They argue that firms with high Tobin  have easier access to external finance 
in countries with stronger investor protection. In these countries, authors have also 
noted a lower sensitivity of the investments to cash flow as well as a negative link 
between external finance and cash flow. In short, a high level of investor protection 
ensures more efficient stock and / or debt issuing, so financing of potential invest-
ments does not rely solely on internal finance. Their research findings are in line with 
previous empirical research that demonstrated that developed capital markets, with 
more effective legal investor protection, encourage more accurate stock valuations, 
more efficient investments, and better access to external finance (Love, 2003; Wur-
gler, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Fazzari et al., 2000; etc).
The quality of the investor protection equally affects the readiness of foreign in-
vestors to invest in domestic firms. This was pointed out by Poshakwale & Tha-
pa (2011) who emphasize the importance of the investor protection mechanisms in 
cross-border investments. On a sample of 36 countries in the period 2001-2006 the 
authors have demonstrated that investor protection measures, especially those relat-
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ed to foreign investors, are important determinants of foreign portfolio investments. 
This has shown that domestic authorities can encourage foreign investors to par-
ticipate in the domestic capital markets simply by improving the quality of foreign 
investors’ rights.
When it comes to the effects of investor protection on dividend policy, La Por-
ta et al. (2000) argue that dividends are outcome of effective investor protection, 
rather than its substitute, because stronger investor protection makes insider manip-
ulation legally risky. Thus, effective protection implies the possibility to use legal 
mechanisms to extract dividends if there is a suspicion that earnings retention would 
not benefit shareholders. Their research has also shown that fast growing firms pay 
lower dividends in countries with stronger investor protection, indicating that inves-
tors are willing to wait for dividends when investment opportunities are good and 
property rights are legally secured. By contrast, in countries with weaker investor 
protection, shareholders require dividend distribution irrespective of firm investment 
opportunities. However, Bhattacharya et al. (2016) found that corporate governance 
serves as substitute for the firm dividend policy when its idiosyncratic risk is high, 
while Moortgat et al. (2017) found that investor protection almost had no impact on 
dividend policy of Belgian firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. Similarly, 
Atanassov & Mandell (2018) document that firms with weaker governance pay more 
cash dividends than better governed firms. 
In addition, empirical research has shown that there is a different approach to 
dividend policy between public and private firms. As Michaely &  Roberts (2012) 
point out, privately owned firms are significantly less likely to pay dividends than 
publicly traded firms, indicating that market monitoring plays an important role when 
it comes to the propensity of firms to pay dividends.  On the other hand, Caoa et al. 
(2017) found that foreign institutional investors tend to allocate funds in Chinese 
firms that pay high dividends but they do not affect firm’s future dividend payouts.
Structure of research and sample selection
The first part of the paper consists of sensitivity analysis of dividends to earnings 
changes across four legal families using the contingency tables. In this respect, div-
idend changes are classified as an increase, decrease, no change and dividend cut. 
Similarly, changes in earnings are classified as an increase, decrease, no change and 
loss. The aim of the analysis is to prove the universality of the dividend smoothing 
phenomenon. If dividend smoothing is a widespread approach to dividends then it is 
justified to define the importance of dividends by this concept. It is quite reasonable 
to assume that most firms will increase dividends in case of earnings growth regard-
less of whether or not firms apply dividend smoothing policy. In contrary, if firms 
follow the dividend smoothing policy, the decline in earnings will not be followed by 
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reduction in dividends nor will negative business result lead to the dividend cuts in 
most of the cases. 
In the second part of the research, the so called “outcome” model of dividends 
was tested. This model has been studied previously by La Porta et al. (2000). They 
found that firms operating within common law countries have higher dividend pay-
out ratios, measured by dividend to earnings ratio, dividend to operating profit ratio 
and dividend to cash flow ratio. They based their work on cross-section dataset of 
average payout ratios. However, the word “policy” implies a consistent approach to 
certain phenomena over a longer period of time, so the importance of dividends is 
more accurately defined by dividend smoothing policy if the reluctance to decrease 
or cut dividends is universal phenomena. For this reason, the differences of dividend 
smoothing levels between civil and common law countries have been tested using 
test. The aim of this test is to find a more reliable answer to the question of whether 
dividends are more important in countries that strongly protect the rights of investors 
or emerge as a substitute for investor protection in countries with weaker investor 
protection. In this respect, the importance of dividends is approximated by the ten-
dency of smoothing dividends while the level of investor protection is determined by 
the legal origin. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, the dividend smooth-
ing phenomenon is defined very strictly - not reducing dividends per share for 5 
years. The level of dividend smoothing is defined by the percentage of firms that did 
not reduce dividends for five consecutive years in the total number of firms that paid 
dividends for 5 years in a row.
After analyzing the sensitivity of dividends for given changes in earnings and 
after testing the differences of dividend smoothing levels between civil and common 
law countries, the analysis focused on testing the Lintner’s model of dividends in 
transition countries (former Yugoslavia countries and other transition countries) and 
within United States as comparable country with most developed and mature capital 
market where this model was initially recognized. Testing of the Lintner’s model was 
conducted using a multiple linear regression – pooled OLS.
In accordance with described steps of the research, three research samples were 
used. The first, which analyzes the probability of a changes in dividends for a given 
changes in earnings, consists of 3,994 nonfinancial firms from 22 units, 20 of which 
refer to individual countries, while the two units refer to characteristic groups of 
countries (former Yugoslavia countries and other transition countries). The two sep-
arate groups of countries are defined due to insufficient number of firms for separate 
treatment of certain countries. Only the countries for which research data on research 
variables were available were selected in the sample. The group of former Yugosla-
via countries consists of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
while the group of other transition countries is made up of Soviet bloc countries - 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - and other transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe such as Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. 
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The other 20 units are: United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Can-
ada, Japan, China, Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Ireland. The sample of 3,994 
non-financial public firms is created out of firms that had paid dividends for at least 
5 years throughout research period of 10 years (2003-2012.). Financial firms such 
as banks, insurance firms, investment firms, etc. are excluded from research sam-
ple because of the specific nature of their business. All firms that lacked data on 
dividend payments within the research period, as well as those firms that have not 
paid dividends at least 5 years, were not part of the research sample. Furthermore, 
the first sample is classified into 4 categories according to the classification of legal 
families used in work of La Porta et al. (1998). The corresponding number of firms 
by category is as follows:
1. Anglo-Saxon – Common Law (1,275 firms)
2. Continental-Civil Law
 a. German family (1,446 firms)
 b. French family (428 firms)
 c. Scandinavian Family (245 firms)
The second research sample, which was used to test the differences of dividend 
smoothing levels between civil and common law countries, is drawn from the first 
research sample by introducing an additional criterion, continuous dividend payment 
5 year in a row (2008-2012). The data was initially collected for a period of 10 years 
(2003-2012), however, the research period was reduced to five years in order to iso-
late the potential impact of the 2008 financial crisis, which would certainly have a 
negative effect on dividend smoothing levels presented with the strict definition of 
dividend smoothing - not reducing dividends for 10 years in a row. In this way, the 
second research sample consists of the 3,171 nonfinancial firms that paid dividends 
for 5 consecutive years. The number of firms by country or by group of countries is 
shown in Table 2 together with research findings presented in section 5 of this paper.
The third research sample, used for testing the Lintner’s model, consists of 480 
firms which paid dividends for 10 consecutive years (2003-2012), with 21 firms from 
the former Yugoslavia region, 34 firms from other transition countries and 425 firms 
from the United States. The term “transition countries” in this paper refers to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union countries 
which have been transformed from central planning into a market economy. A group 
of other transition countries consists of countries for which data on earnings and div-
idend per share were available for a period of 10 years (2003-2012), namely: Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. The same rule applies to 
the group of former Yugoslavia countries where only Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia entered. It should be noted that in this case, dividend 
smoothing has a somewhat weaker definition of smoothing measured by the speed 
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of adjustment coefficient, so it is not necessary to isolate the potential effect of the 
financial crisis as in the case of criteria that would require no reduction in dividends 
for consecutive 10 years.
Dividends per share (DPS) data and earnings per share (EPS) data were collected 
from the Reuters Information Service and in the case of Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina from the audited and consolidated financial reports of sample firms. The 
effects of the exploratory variables were determined on the basis of their significance 
or p-value. The statistical programs SPSS and STATA were used for the implemen-
tation of the above mentioned statistical methods and tests.
Are firms globally reluctant to cut or decrease dividends?
The relationship between dividends and earnings changes across legal families is 
best seen trough contingency table. As we can see, when earnings increase, vast 
majority of firms in all legal families increase dividends (from 59.7% in German to 
75.1% in the French civil law). As previously emphasized, looking at the “increase” 
category of earnings and dividends alone, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about 
the practice of dividend smoothing, since any increase may, but not be, justified by a 
higher level of profits. In that sense, if dividends were strongly sensitive to earnings 
changes, then similar results would be expected in case of earnings decrease. How-
ever, when earnings fall, much smaller percentage of firms decrease dividends while 
most of them continue to hold or increase dividends per share despite fall in earnings. 
Such conclusions are derived from Table 1 which shows the probability of changing 
dividends in a certain direction given certain change in earnings
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Table 1: Frequencies of dividend changes given changes in earnings
CLASSIFICATION BY LEGAL ORIGIN 
(La Porta et al. 1998)
DIVIDEND CHANGES





Common law 45.9% 44.1% 9.5% .5%
Civil law (German family) 41.7% 50.0% 8.3% .0%
Civil law (French family) 50.0% 33.3% 14.6% 2.1%
Civil law (Scandinavian family) 16.7% 50.0% 25.0% 8.3%
Increase
Common law 24.0% 70.3% 4.6% 1.1%
Civil law (German family) 34.3% 59.7% 5.8% .2%
Civil law (French family) 16.7% 75.1% 7.5% .6%
Civil law (Scandinavian family) 15.5% 75.1% 8.5% .8%
Decrease
Common law 30.8% 52.6% 15.0% 1.6%
Civil law (German family) 52.1% 27.0% 20.4% .5%
Civil law (French family) 30.8% 33.8% 31.8% 3.6%
Civil law (Scandinavian family) 29.3% 31.0% 35.4% 4.2%
Loss
Common law 35.4% 18.3% 29.9% 16.4%
Civil law (German family) 38.6% 5.9% 37.4% 18.1%
Civil law (French family) 23.3% 13.2% 29.1% 34.4%
Civil law (Scandinavian family) 22.4% 13.9% 33.9% 29.7%
Source: Džidić (2016)
As shown in the previous table, in the case of earnings growth, majority of firms 
in all legal families increase dividends per share, with the largest percentage of firms 
increasing the dividends being recorded in the French and Scandinavian civil law 
family. Conversely, in the case of earnings decrease, more than 60% of the firms in 
each of the legal families increase or retain dividends per share at the same level. At 
the same time, the smallest percentage of firms that decrease dividends after decline 
in earnings was recorded among the common law countries - 15%. Across civil law 
countries the smallest percentage of dividend decreases was recorded in the German 
family - 20.4 percent. In other words, the largest percentage of firms that increase 
or retain dividends per share at the same level after decline in earnings was record-
ed in common law countries - 83.4% (30.8% + 52.6%), followed by German legal 
family - 79.1% (52.1 % + 27%), French legal family - 64.6% (30.8% + 33.8%) and 
Scandinavian legal family - 60.3% (29.3% + 31%). Manager aversion to cut dividends 
was best shown in cases of negative earnings, where the percentage of dividend cuts 
stood bellow 35% in each group of the legal families. Across civil law countries, 
firms in French (34.4%) and Scandinavian (29.7%) legal family reacted more strongly 
to the loss compared to firms in the German legal family (18.1%), and in particular 
with respect to the common law countries, where only 16.4% of firms decided to cut 
dividends.
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Research results show global aversion to decrease or cut dividends, but point to 
clear distinction between levels of such aversion in different legal environments. Hav-
ing in mind the fact that the level of investor protection affects their readiness to in-
vest and that common legal origin more strongly protects shareholders irrespective of 
GDP per capita (La Porta et al., 1998), it can be argued that the differences in capital 
market development between these two legal origins are, inter alia, the consequence 
of a different approach to investor protection. Hence, the more developed capital 
market the greater importance of dividends as signalling mechanism used by firms to 
signal fair treatment of shareholders through a stable, continuous, and to some extent 
certain, dividend payout.
Dividend smoothing - Civil vs. Common legal origin
Table 2 shows countries from the second research sample, their legal origin, the per-
centage of dividend smoothing firms – i.e. not reducing dividend per share five years 
in a row (PERCENT), as well as the related rating of investor protection measured by 
Anti-self-dealing Index indicator (ASDI) from work of Djankov et al. (2008). Within 
the group of countries in the region, only Croatia has the ASDI rating of investor pro-
tection. In the absence of a better indicator and due to the similarity of legal origin of 
neighbour countries, ASDI rating for Croatia was taken as a common measure for all 
the countries in the former Yugoslavia region. For a group of other transition coun-
tries the level of investor protection was measured by the group average of the ASDI 
index. At the bottom of the table, t-statistics are presented for tests of the proportions 
of dividend smoothing firms between civil and common law countries, and then for 
the tests of the averages of the ASDI ratings between those groups.
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Table 2: Testing the differences in dividend smoothing levels and investor protection 
ratings
Country Number of firms  PERCENT ASDI Legal origin
Australia 157 0.42 0.79 Common
Austria 24 0.42 0.21 Civil
Belgium 20 0.50 0.54 Civil
Switzerland 51 0.25 0.27 Civil
China 228 0.34 0.78 Civil
Germany 61 0.43 0.28 Civil
Denmark 24 0.46 0.47 Civil
Spain 28 0.32 0.37 Civil
Finland 45 0.33 0.46 Civil
France 187 0.44 0.38 Civil
Great Britain 294 0.68 0.93 Common
Italy 49 0.33 0.39 Civil
Japan 1025 0.35 0.48 Civil
Netherlands 31 0.45 0.21 Civil
Norway 24 0.42 0.44 Civil
New Zealand 38 0.34 0.95 Common
Portugal 12 0.25 0.49 Civil
Sweden 71 0.49 0.34 Civil
United States 516 0.78 0.65 Common
Canada 184 0.44 0.65 Common
Other transition countries 75 0.15 0.45 Civil
Former Yugoslavia countries 33 0.15 0.25 Civil
 Mean diff. Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0   Ha: diff > 0
Civil vs. Common  (PERCENT) -0,1754 Pr(T < t) = 0.0070
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 
0.0140 Pr(T > t) = 0.9930
Civil vs. Common (ASDI) -0,3932 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 
0.0000  Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
Source: Author’s Calculation
As can be seen from Table 2, at a significance level of 1 percent, there is a signifi-
cantly smaller percentage of dividend smoothing firms in civil law countries than in 
common law countries. In addition, at 1% significance level, there is also a signifi-
cantly lower average rating of investor protection (ASDI) in the same group of coun-
tries. Bearing in mind that dividends are one of the two sources of equity investment 
returns, the results show that consistent policy of dividend smoothing becomes more 
important with more developed capital markets that systematically protect investors, 
regardless of the level of their influence on decision-making. This is in line with pre-
vious research of La Porta et al. (2000) who have shown that firms operating within 
common law countries have greater dividend payout ratios.
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Do firms in transition countries follow the Lintner’s model?
Lintner’s model is based on current earnings and previous year’s dividends with a 
higher emphasis being placed on dividend changes rather than absolute amount of 
dividend per share. The Lintner’s findings demonstrate that the management of the 
firm is conservative in terms of increasing dividends if such increase is subject to 
correction in the foreseeable future. He argued that firms smooth dividends by ad-
justing them to long-term target payout ratio, whereby the change in current divi-
dends is the function of current earnings and previous year’s dividends. In his 1956 
work, Lintner points out that most dividend decisions can be explained on the basis 






Constant  will be zero for individual firms (which do not pay dividends) but will 
generally be positive because it reflects the aversion towards dividend reduction. The 
term  represents the difference between the observed and expected changes in  on the 
basis of other terms in the equation (Lintner, 1956, p. 107). By substitution of (2) into 








France 187 0.44 0.38 Civil
Great Britain 294 0.68 0.93 Common
Italy 49 0.33 0.39 Civil
Japan 1025 0.35 0.48 Civil
Netherlands 31 0.45 0.21 Civil
Norway 24 0.42 0.44 Civil
New Zealand 38 0.34 0.95 Common
Portugal 12 0.25 0.49 Civil
Sweden 71 0.49 0.34 Civil
United States 516 0.78 0.65 Common
Canada 184 0.44 0.65 Common
Other transition countries 75 0.15 0.45 Civil
Former Yugoslavia countries 33 0.15 0.25 Civil
Mean diff. Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Civil vs. Common  (PERCENT) -0,1754 Pr(T < t) = 0.0070 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0140  Pr(T > t) = 0.9930
Civil vs. Common (ASDI) -0,3932 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000   Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
Source: Author's Calculation 
As can be seen from Table 2, at a significance level of 1 percent, there is a significantly 
smaller percentage of dividend smoothing firms in civil law countries than in common law 
countries. In addition, at 1% significance level, there is also a significantly lower average rating 
of investor protection (ASDI) in the same group of countries. Bearing in mind that dividends are 
one of the two sources of equity investment returns, the results show that consistent policy of 
dividend smoothing becomes more important with more developed capital markets that 
systematically protect investors, regardless of the level of their influence on decision-making. 
This is in line with previous research of La Porta et al. (2000) who have shown that firms 
operating within common law countries have greater dividend payout ratios. 
Do firms in transition countries follow the Lintner's model? 
Lintner's model is based on current earnings and previous year's dividends with a higher 
emphasis being placed on dividend changes rather than absolute amount of dividend per share.
The Lintner's findings demonstrate that the management of the firm is conservative in terms of 
increasing dividends if such increase is subject to correction in the foreseeable future. He argued 
that firms smooth dividends by adjusting them to long-term target payout ratio, whereby the 
change in current dividends is the function of current earnings and previous year's dividends. In 
his 1956 work, Lintner points out that most dividend decisions can be explained on the basis of 
the following equation: 




                                                                    𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                              (2)
and where 
Di𝑖t∗ = Planned dividend payment in period t
Dit = Actual dividend payment in period t
ri = Target payout ratio 
Eit = Net profit for the period t
αi = The constant associated with the growth of dividends 
ci = Partial adjustment factor 
uit = Error term 
Constant 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 will be zero for individual firms (which do not pay divid nds) but will 
generally be p sitiv  because it reflects the aversion towards dividend reduction. The term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
represents the differe ce between the observed and exp cted cha ges in 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 on the basis of other 
terms in the equation (Lintner, 1956, p. 107). By substitution of (2) into (1) the model can be 
simplified into the form of multiple regression analysis as follows: 
                                                      𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                (3)
or 
                                                      𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                       (4) 
Thus, the statistical model for testing the Lintner's model of dividends can be written as: 
                                𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                  (5)
where 
DPSi𝑖t = Current dividend per share 
EPSi𝑖t = Earnings per share, after tax 
DPSi𝑖t𝑖𝑖 = Dividend per share in previous year 
β𝑖 = rici
β2 = 1−ci
The proposed model implies that dividend changes are the function of current earnings 
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(5)
where
The proposed model implies that dividend changes are the function of current 
earnings and previous year’s dividends, where the speed of adjustment coefficient is 
estimated as 1−b2, and the target payout ratio as b1/(1 – b2). The model was tested 
on secondary panel data using multiple regression analysis - pooled OLS with vce 
(cluster firm) option that controls for the problem of heteroscedasticity and autocor-
relation. Regression results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Pooled OLS results (Lintner’s model)
former Yugoslavia 
countries
Other transition   
countries United States






Constant 3.6361 0.6020* 0.1015**
(1.81) (2.35) (2.86)
Observations 189 306 3825
Prob > F 
R-squared 
F(2, 20) =  262.92
0.0000
0.6250
F(2, 35) =  147.29
0.0000
0.8531
F( 2, 424) =  222.25
0.0000
0.7634
t statistics in parentheses; *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001
Source: Author’s Calculation
Pooled OLS results show that current earnings per share, as well as previous year’s 
dividends per share, are significant predictors of current dividends at 5% significance 
level in both groups of transition countries. The same is true for United States, the 
most developed capital market in the world, where the Lintner’s model was originally 
tested. Moreover, regression coefficient of lagged dividends is statistically significant 
at 0.1% significance level in all groups of countries. The R-squared statistic shows 
that Lintner’s model explains 62.50% of dividend behaviour in former Yugoslavia 
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sample, 85.31% in other transition countries and 76.34% in United States (original 
Lintner’s model explained 85% of dividend changes). The F statistic is significant 
at 1% significance level in each group of countries indicating overall validity of the 
models.
Having in mind the settings of the Lintner’s model, it is clear that the speed of 
adjustment coefficient is estimated as 1 – b2, and the target payout ratio as b1/(1 – b2). 
In this way, the former Yugoslavia countries and other transition countries recorded 
an average target payout ratio of 35%, while the US recorded a somewhat lower target 
payout ratio of 20%. Furthermore, the highest speed of adjustment coefficient was 
recorded in former Yugoslavia countries - 0.33, followed by other transition countries 
- 0.24 while the lowest adjustment rate of dividends being recorded in United States 
- 0.16. Lintner originally recorded the average target dividend payout ratio of 50% 
and the average speed of adjustment of 30%. The lower target payout ratio compared 
to the Lintner’s research period is the consequence of a well documented significant 
decline in propensity to pay dividends. This phenomenon was recognized by Fama 
and French (2001) documenting that the share of U.S. firms paying dividends fell 
from 66.5 percent in 1978 to 20.8 percent in 1999. The cause of this trend was found 
in new firms on the stock exchange (after 1978) that had good growth opportunities, 
lower assets and lower profitability, which are, according to previous research, typical 
characteristics of firms that do not pay dividends. DeAngelo et al. (2004), on the other 
hand, responded that, although the number of dividend paying firms has decreased 
by more than 50 percent in the last two decades, total paid dividends increased in 
the same period, concentrating among smaller number of firms. The authors point 
out that increase in dividends among top dividend payers exceeds modest reductions 
across firms that pay lower dividends. Globally reduced propensity to pay dividends 
was also shown in recent study by Fatemi & Bildik (2012) on a sample of 17,106 firms 
drawn from 33 countries in the period from 1985 to 2006. The authors found that the 
number of dividend payers dropped from 87% to 53%, and the main reason for this 
was the increased tendency of firms to buy back their own stocks.
On the other hand, existing differences in speed of adjustment coefficients be-
tween the former Yugoslavia countries, other transition countries and the United 
States can be explained by the difference in levels of investor protection measured by 
ASDI index. According to this index United States has the highest rating of investor 
protection - 0.65, followed by other transition countries – 0.45 and former Yugosla-
via countries - 0.25. Even within civil law countries the level of investor protection 
explains the differences in dividend smoothing levels to some extent. These results, 
together with the previous validations of the Lintner’s model, show the widespread 
application of the Lintner’s model irrespective of the country legal origin, so it is rea-
sonable to state that the Lintner’s model is still the best model of dividends behaviour. 
On the other hand, it is clear that the difference in levels of investor protection reflect 
the difference in levels of dividend smoothing. This is best seen trough percentages 
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of dividend smoothing firms among different legal environments as well as the dif-
ferences in the speed of adjustment coefficients.
Conclusion
This paper deals with the agency’s model of dividends according to which the im-
portance of dividends is determined by the degree of investor protection. Within 
this, the sensitivity of dividends to earnings changes was analyzed within the four 
legal families with the aim of making conclusions about the universality of dividend 
smoothing phenomena. Subsequently, a dividend smoothing levels between common 
law countries and the civil law countries were compared by analyzing the percentage 
of firms that did not reduce dividends for five consecutive years in the total number 
of firms that paid dividends for five years in a row. Finally, the Lintner’s model was 
tested in transition countries (former Yugoslavia countries and other transition coun-
tries) as well as in the United States.
The results of the first part of the paper, summarized in Table 1, show that in each 
of the four legal families, more than 60% of firms are increasing or retaining dividends 
at the same level despite a decline in earnings, with this percentage being the highest in 
common law countries, 83,4 percent. On the basis of these results, it can be concluded that 
the phenomenon of the dividend smoothing is globally present and dominant in common 
law countries which are characterized by stronger mechanisms of investor protection 
and greater dividend payout ratios La Porta et al. (1998, 2000). The same conclusion is 
reached in the second part of the study, which tested the difference of proportions of div-
idend smoothing firms between common and civil law countries. The results show that 
common law countries have a significantly larger percentage of firms that smooth divi-
dends at 1% significance level. In the third part of the study, it is found that the Lintner’s 
model still well explains dividends behaviour in United Sates as well as in both groups of 
transition countries, with the slowest speed of adjustment coefficient (0.15) being record-
ed in the United States. Furthermore, dividend paying firms from other transition coun-
tries recorded a lower speed of adjustment coefficient than firms in the former Yugoslavia 
countries, which to some extent can be explained by a higher level of investor protection 
in other transition countries measured by the anti-self dealing index. 
Having in mind these research results, it seems that investor preferences for divi-
dends are best proven by the use of legal mechanisms of investor protection to extract 
dividends. For this reason, side effects of agency issues may be the best answer to 
the question why firms are paying dividends. This is also shown by this paper, as the 
largest percentage of dividend smoothing firms is recorded in common law countries 
that generally have stronger investor protection. In addition to this, the lowest speed 
of adjustment coefficient is recorded in the United States as a typical representative 
of common law countries with highly developed capital market. 
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The positive impact of investor protection on dividend stability is in line with hy-
pothesis that dividends are output of strong investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000). 
This indicates that dividends are very important to investors, especially in the case 
of weaker investment opportunities. Therefore, decision makers who seek to improve 
capital markets and systematically incentivize participation of domestic and foreign 
investors in domestic capital markets should strive for effective legal mechanisms 
that help investors materialize their ownership rights. This is also important insight 
for portfolio investors who prefer to allocate funds in dividend paying stocks, espe-
cially in times of low interest rates.
This empirical research, as well as any other research, has certain limitations and 
shortcomings that represent new research challenges. These limitations are primarily 
related to the quality of data from other transition countries and the former Yugosla-
via countries, as well as the youth of their capital markets, which does not provide 
enough firms for analysis to form more sound conclusions on the engagement of these 
firms in dividend smoothing. In the end, the lack of data on dividends and earnings 
per share for firms in certain countries such as Serbia and Montenegro or other tran-
sition countries, to a certain extent, distorts the general conclusion on the dividend 
policy of firms in these groups of countries. Overcoming these limitations is order to 
gain stronger conclusions about the importance of dividend policy in different legal 
environments is fruitful avenue for future research.
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